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Agency theory : methodology, analysis ; a structured approach to writing contracts / / Alexander Stremitzer
Agency theory : methodology, analysis ; a structured approach to writing contracts / / Alexander Stremitzer
Autore Stremitzer Alexander
Edizione [1st ed.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Bern, : Peter Lang International Academic Publishing Group, 2018
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (various pagings) : illustrations; digital, PDF file(s)
Disciplina 346.0201
Collana Forschungsergebnisse der Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien
Soggetto topico Agency (Law)
Contracts - Methodology
Soggetto non controllato Agency
Agency-Theorie
Analysis
Approach
asymmetrische Information
Contracts
Joint Ventures
Kontrakttheorie
Methodology
Netzwerk
Outsourcing
private Information
Stremitzer
Structured
Theory
Transaktionsbeziehung
Vertrag
Writing
ISBN 3-631-75400-0
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Cover -- I INTRODUCTION -- 1 The Contracting Problem -- 2 Applications -- 3 Models of Contracting -- 4 Obsession with Modeling Single Effects -- 5 Methodological Reflection -- 6 A Note to the Reader -- II EPISTEMIC PROBLEMS AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE -- 1 Overview -- 2 The Objectives of Science -- 3 What makes Science scientific? -- 4 Absolute Justification -- 4.1 Basic Concepts of Cognition -- 4.2 Strategies to derive scientific statements -- 4.2.1 Introduction -- 4.2.2 Inductivism -- 4.2.3 Pragmatism - Foundation by Method -- 4.2.4 Falsificationism -- 4.2.5 Conclusion -- 5 Beyond Absolute Justification -- 5.1 Against Scepticism -- 5.2 Dogmatism -- 5.3 Common Sense -- 5.4 An Axiomatic Approach -- 6 The First Principle: Its Cognitive Status -- 6.1 Consequences of Relativism -- 6.2 Overcoming Relativism -- 7 Methodological Implications -- III THE METHOD OF ECONOMICS AND CONTRACT THEORY -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Overview -- 3 Instrumentalism vs. Realism -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Natural vs. Social Sciences -- 4 Methodological Individualism -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Rational Choice -- 4.2.1 Choice under Certainty -- 4.2.2 Choice under Uncertainty -- 4.3 A Remark on Game Theory -- 4.4 Defending Rational Choice on Normative Grounds -- 4.5 Economics as a Formal vs. Real Science -- 4.6 Realism of Assumptions -- 4.7 Defending Homo Oeconomicus -- 4.7.1 Introduction -- 4.7.2 Relevant Situations -- 4.7.3 Scope of Concepts -- 4.7.4 Robustness - Worst Case -- 4.7.5 Instrumentalism in Modeling -- 4.8 Bounded Rationality vs. Unconscious Rationality -- 4.8.1 Introduction -- 4.8.2 The Evolutionary Mechanism -- 4.8.3 Method of Evolutionary Economics -- 4.9 Piecemeal Social Engineering -- 4.10 Objection of Historicism -- 5< -- tab/> -- Introspection in Economics -- 5.1 Internal dimension and Instability -- 5.2 Blackboxing vs. Qualitative Method.
5.3 Heuristic or Independent Source? -- 5.4 The Hermeneutical Method and a priorism -- 6 Empirical Methods -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Reviving Monism -- 6.2.1 Theory of Revealed Preferences -- 6.2.2 Panphysicalism -- 6.3 Interviews -- 6.4 Controlled Experiment -- 6.5 Econometrics - Historical Experiment -- 6.6 Informal evidence -- 6.7 The Problem of Aggregation -- 6.8 Macro modeling: Beyond Methodological Individualism -- 6.9 Verificationism vs. Falsifications: A Normative Evaluation -- 7 Applied Microeconomics -- 7.1 Applied Microeconomics as an Art -- 7.2 Convergence of Applied Microeconomics and BWL -- 8 Model of Optimal Contract Design -- 8.1 Economics of Institutions -- 8.2 Solving for the Optimal Contract -- 8.3 The Rationale for the Micro-foundation -- 8.4 A Structured Approach -- 9 Practical Life and Theory -- IV ANALYTICAL AGENCY MODELS -- 1 Overview -- 2 The Classical Risk-Incentive Trade-Off -- 2.1 The Basic Model -- 2.1.1 Introduction -- 2.1.2 Modeling Assumptions -- 2.1.3 Contractible Effort -- 2.1.4 Uncontractible Effort -- 2.1.5 Discussion -- 2.2 Risk-Incentive Trade-off for Linear Contracts -- 2.2.1 Introduction -- 2.2.2 Modeling Assumptions -- 2.2.3 The Model -- 2.2.4 Discussion -- 2.2.5 Appendix -- 2.3 Risk Sharing -- 2.3.1 Introduction -- 2.3.2 The Model -- 2.3.3 Model Extension: Diversification -- 2.3.4 Discussion -- 2.4 The Optimal Contract -- 2.4.1 Introduction -- 2.4.2 Mechanics of the Optimal Sharing Rule -- 2.4.3 The Case for Linear Contracts -- 2.4.4 Valuable Information -- 2.4.5 Discussion -- 2.5 Limitations and Extensions -- 3 Error in judgement, Bankruptcy -- 3.1 Input Monitoring -- 3.1.1 Introduction -- 3.1.2 Modeling Assumptions -- 3.1.3 Absence of both Error and Bankruptcy Constraint -- 3.1.4 Bankruptcy constraint -- 3.1.5 Extension: The role of Agent Risk Averseness -- 3.1.6 Presence of Error -- 3.1.7 Discussion.
3.2 Output Monitoring -- 3.2.1 Introduction -- 3.2.2 Shifting Support -- 3.2.3 Moral Hazard with respect to Risk -- 3.2.4 Discussion -- 4 Transaction Cost, Bonding, Distortion -- 4.1 Transaction Cost and Bonding -- 4.2 Distortion -- 4.2.1 Introduction -- 4.2.2 The Model -- 4.2.3 Discussion -- 5 Dynamic Extensions -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Income smoothing -- 5.2.1 Introduction -- 5.2.2 The Model -- 5.2.3 Discussion -- 5.3 Reputation Effects in Supergames -- 5.3.1 Introduction -- 5.3.2 Observable but Uncontractible Effort -- 5.3.3 Observable but Uncontractible Output -- 5.3.4 Reinterpretation of the Discount rate -- 5.3.5 A Multiparty Extension -- 5.3.6 Discussion -- 5.4 Career Concerns - Learning -- 5.4.1 Introduction -- 5.4.2 The Basic Model -- 5.4.3 Extension: Adding Innovation -- 5.4.4 Disequilibrium - Transient Effects -- 5.4.5 Discussion -- V CONCLUSIONS -- 1.1 Results -- 1.2 Checklist -- 1.3 Outlook.
Record Nr. UNINA-9910297054203321
Stremitzer Alexander  
Bern, : Peter Lang International Academic Publishing Group, 2018
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Rechtsfragen offener Netze : rechtliche Gestaltung und Haftung des Access Providers in zugangsoffenen (Funk-)Netzen
Rechtsfragen offener Netze : rechtliche Gestaltung und Haftung des Access Providers in zugangsoffenen (Funk-)Netzen
Autore Mantz Reto
Pubbl/distr/stampa KIT Scientific Publishing, 2008
Descrizione fisica 1 electronic resource (LXXIV, 343 p.)
Collana Schriften des Zentrums für Angewandte Rechtswissenschaft / ZAR, Zentrum für Angewandte Rechtswissenschaft, Universität Karlsruhe (TH)
Soggetto non controllato Netzwerk
Netz
WLAN
Haftung
Access Provider
ISBN 1000007749
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione ger
Record Nr. UNINA-9910346935303321
Mantz Reto  
KIT Scientific Publishing, 2008
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Rudolf Eitelberger von Edelberg : : Netzwerker der Kunstwelt / / Tanja Jenni, Kathrin Pokorny-Nagel, Raphael Rosenberg, Patrick Werkner, Eva Kernbauer, Julia Rüdiger
Rudolf Eitelberger von Edelberg : : Netzwerker der Kunstwelt / / Tanja Jenni, Kathrin Pokorny-Nagel, Raphael Rosenberg, Patrick Werkner, Eva Kernbauer, Julia Rüdiger
Autore Kernbauer Eva
Pubbl/distr/stampa Böhlau, 2019
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (1 p.)
Soggetto topico Theory of art
Soggetto non controllato Arts
Kunstgeschichte
Denkmalpflege
Briefwechsel
Netzwerk
Kulturkontakte
Kunstrezeption
19. Jahrhundert
Österreich
Europa
ISBN 3-205-20925-7
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione ger
Record Nr. UNINA-9910324025803321
Kernbauer Eva
Böhlau, 2019
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui